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Post 9/11 Flight Attendant/Pilot communication and security training requirements. Are they adequately addressed in the current climate of aviation? |
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The events of September 11th, 2001, have
magnified the importance of the flight attendants
in protecting the safety of the passengers
and crew, as well as, providing sometimes
critical information to the pilots. The threat
to aviation safety has changed, and so must
our response.
The events of September 11 changed forever
our concepts of appropriate aviation safety.
The use of a hijacked aircraft as a weapon
requires a new strategy to ensure that the
crew always retains control of the aircraft.
The attempts of those valiant flight attendants
onboard United Airlines flight 93, to provide
vital information to those on the ground,
as well as their actions, serve as alarming
reminders that the cabin crew is essential
to the safety of the aircraft and passengers.
Effective communication and synergy between
the flight deck and cabin crew has never
been more significant and challenging. If
an emergency or terrorist attack should occur
it is imperative that the crew work effectively.
Communication and coordination between pilots
and flight attendants should not be taken
for granted. In Part 121 air carrier operations
critical coordination and relationships may
be hindered by the fact the crews have little
time to brief prior to the flight. Lack of
joint security training exercises, a reluctance
to contact the flight deck, misunderstanding
of the "sterile cockpit rule",
(F.A.R. 121.542) all create a dangerous gap
in communication and coordination, further
impeded by the cockpit door strengthening
requirement, mandated as a result of the
2001 terrorist attacks. Errors have been
documented which illustrate the convergence
of barriers in information transfer between
the flight attendants and pilots and the
anticipated stress related effects on communication.
(Chute 1996) In light of 9/11 and post 9/11
events, we can not afford to have any barriers
that would impede effective communication
and coordination between the two groups.
The tension of an emergency or attack would
only complicate human interactions, which
could prove to be devastating in a sudden
onboard emergency. Previous research has
explored the coordination of "two cultures"
between the pilot's and flight attendants.
In particular, the situation when the flight
attendants have safety related information
and have to decide whether to tell the pilots.
The results have shown confusion and reluctance
about when it is permissible and what information
to take to the cockpit.
One of the most poignant examples occurred
on March 10, 1989, when 21 people were killed
on board Air Ontario's F-28 that crashed
on takeoff from Dryden, Canada due to ice
accumulation on the wings. As the aircraft
waited for takeoff, a flight attendant, Sonia
Hartwick, saw the snow accumulation on the
wings of the aircraft. She did not call the
cockpit to tell the pilots because she thought
the pilots did not welcome operational information
from the flight attendants. In the past she
felt that she had appeared stupid when relating
safety concerns to the pilots. Hartwick testified
that she had the feeling that Air Ontario's
management was not supportive of flight attendants
voicing operational concerns. She placed
an inordinate amount of faith in the pilots
being aware of every situation and believed
that their professionalism and training would
suffice. (Moshansky 1992) One off duty pilot
was also concerned about the snow; but was
reluctant to inform the flight deck.
Research by Helmreich (1979) has shown that
individuals under stress tend to be more
obedient and supplicant to authority figures.
Junior crew members can become so passive
and differential that they fail to supply
the vital information needed. Additionally,
9/11 security issues were brought to light
in 2004, when unions and flight attendants
demanded security training. (Holm 2004) May
2004, The Association of Flight Attendants
demanded that the Transportation Security
Administration require the nation's airlines
to provide flight attendants with security
training. More than 100 flight attendants
rallied on Capitol Hill to reintroduced legislation
that would require airlines to give attendants
mandatory counterterrorism training. "It
is unconscionable that the decision of who
should be trained and to what extent they
should be trained should be left to the airlines",
said Alice Hoglan, a former United Airlines
flight attendant. Her son, Mark Bingham,
died during the Sept. 11th attacks as a passenger
on United Airlines Flight 93, which crashed
in southwestern Pennsylvania. The presidents
of the Association of Flight Attendants,
the Association of Professional Flight Attendants
and The Transport Workers Union Local 556
gave TSA about 10,000 letters written by
flight attendants demanding that what they
call inadequate security training programs
by airlines be examined. "On September
11, 2001, 25 heroic flight attendants lost
their lives trying to protect their passengers
and the cockpit", said AFA president
Patricia Friend. "Implementing comprehensive,
mandatory security training is the only way
to give flight attendants and our passengers
a fighting chance in the event of another
terrorist attack. We owe it to the memory
of the flight attendants that we lost, and
we owe it to the flight attendants who go
to work every day."
On three separate occasions, Congress has
specifically acknowledged the urgent need
for Flight Attendant security training:
The Air Transportation Security Act (2001)
- required the FAA to update and improve
air carriers' existing flight attendant security
training programs to reflect the new terrorist
environment. Because it did not contain specifics
on exactly what the training should include,
each carrier instituted their own program,
so the type of training and time spent on
the training varies from carrier to carrier.
The Homeland Security Act (2002) - mandated
comprehensive, industry-wide, flight attendant
security training standards to be developed
by security experts at the Transportation
Security Administration.
The FAA Reauthorization Act (2003) - the
original language in this legislation contained
a basic, mandatory level of security training
including provisions for crew communication
and coordination, psychology of a terrorist,
and basic moves to defend oneself; and a
voluntary advanced level of training which
would include more aggressive methods of
self-defense and be more physical; and a
requirement that TSA must develop regulations
and guidelines for these trainings. At the
last minute the language for the basic security
training was changed from the TSA "shall"
issue these guidelines to the TSA "may"
issue these guidelines. By changing this
one word, the ability to force TSA to issue
industry-wide guidelines was removed, and
some airlines have succeeded in keeping flight
attendant security almost non-existent.
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The Testimony of Ms. Patricia Friend, International
President, Association of Flight Attendants-CWA,
speaks vigorously about these serious gaps
in security training and procedures in place
for flight attendants.
"AFA is the representative of 45,000
flight attendants at 26 carriers. The job
of a flight attendant is first to protect
the flying public. It is a job that we love
and one that we do with pride and care. We
are trained to fight fires in the air, to
administer first aid, to evacuate an aircraft
in case of an accident, deal with abusive
passengers and to give comfort. We receive
comprehensive training in how to handle all
these situations onboard the aircraft and
are now officially recognized for these roles
through FAA certification. Unbelievably,
almost three years after the horrific events
of September 11th, 2001 we still have not
been trained to appropriately handle a security
crisis onboard on our airplanes. On September
11, 25 heroic flight attendants lost their
lives trying to protect their passengers
and the security of the flight deck. Their
wrists were bound, their throats slashed,
and they died with the knowledge they would
no longer be there to help those whom they
were entrusted to protect. We must not forget
the heroic flight attendants we lost that
tragic day. We all learned from the September
11th Commission report in January and heard
first hand the phone call placed by flight
attendant Betty Ong on American Airlines
flight 11. Her calm demeanor and professionalism
in the face of this attack was a true testament
to her, and all flight attendants', ability
to put their training to good use. As one
television commentator stated after hearing
the presentation of her taped phone conversation,
"she carried out her job professionally
and reacted well to her training. Unfortunately,
she had received the wrong kind of training."
I could not agree more and clearly the 9-11
Commission felt the same. Unfortunately,
I am here to report to you that nothing has
changed since that horrible day. We are no
better prepared today to handle a situation
like that which occurred on September 11th
and our training is still woefully inadequate.
Congress has taken many actions to improve
the overall safety of the aviation system.
Screeners have been federalized and are receiving
updated training. Screening procedures have
been tightened. Flight deck doors are now
reinforced, many pilots carry guns, and armed
federal air marshals are on select flights.
There are new procedures in place for many
aspects of aviation security. However there
is still one crucial link missing. The needs
of flight attendants in order to adequately
perform their roles in making the aviation
system more secure have been delayed, denied
and ignored. Our skies are not safe and they
will not be safe until flight attendants
receive the training necessary to protect
our passengers from another September 11."
The Washington Post reported in December
of 2002 that air marshals still shoot the
flight attendant mock-up in their training
simulations and are still graduating from
the program. Doesn't it make more sense to
train that flight attendant to assist in
a crisis rather than to be a human shield?
Both FFDO's and air marshals have stated
it would be their preference to have the
flight attendant as a trained ally - one
with the skills, the knowledge and the ability
to foil a terrorist. Flight attendants are
the front line safety personnel on the aircraft,
as recognized by the 9-11 Commission; it
was only logical and clear to the flight
attendants of this country that our training
needed to be updated in order for us to effectively
fulfill our role to protect the safety and
security of passengers.
In Summary we find that the existing flight
attendant security training may need to be
changed to reflect the current security and
threats that flight attendants may face onboard
the aircraft Training discrepancies in the
aviation system led to many flight attendants
unprepared for any future terrorist attack
onboard an aircraft. A basic, mandatory level
of security training that included a number
of provisions such as crew communication
and coordination, psychology of terrorist
and basic moves to defend oneself. It has
been said that flight attendants do not need
extensive security training as the passengers
will come to their aid. While that may seem
to be the case, it may not always prove to
be reality.
Recently, a flight attendant for a major
airline was attacked by an abusive passenger.
The passenger lunged at the flight attendant.
He was attempting to grab her. Not one passenger
came to her assistance. It was only because
of the fact that she had taken basic self-defense
classes in college, and remembered that training
was she able to break free from the attacking
passenger. Where does that leave flight attendants
today in their ability to respond to another
terrorist attack onboard aircraft?
Section 603 (6) of the Vision 100 - Century
of Aviation Reauthorization Act as passed
in 2003 provides that TSA shall monitor air
carrier training programs. It states: "In
determining when an air carrier's training
program should be reviewed these regulations
should guarantee that airline training programs
incorporate topics such as, but not limited
to, psychology of a terrorist, verbal command,
items readily available onboard to assist
in self-defense, physical means to defend
oneself and more importantly crew communication
and coordination. This last part is vitally
important if all three parts of the onboard
aviation security team; the pilots, air marshals,
if present, and flight attendants all know
how the other groups have been trained to
react.
The only people who were successful in saving
lives on September 11 were those flight attendants
who actually abandoned their training. With
the help of their passengers they prevented
Flight 93 from being used as a missile. Despite
their training to acquiesce, they fought
back. Yes, they still lost their lives, but
they lost them saving the lives of countless
others. Let's not allow the lesson they taught
us be in vain.
References:
- ASRS Search Request #5280, Part 121/135
Emergency Evacuation Incidents, December
1, 1999.
- Chute, R.D. & Wiener, E.L. (1995a).
Cockpit/cabin communication: I. A tale of
two cultures. The International Journal of
Aviation Psychology, 5 (3), 257-276 Code
of Federal Regulations (2007) F.A.R. 121.542.
Washington, D.C. Federal Aviation Administration.
- Chute, R.D. & Wiener, E.L. (1996).
Cockpit/cabin communication: II. Shall we
tell the pilots? The international Journal
of Aviation Psychology, 6 (93), 211-231.
- Chute, R.D. & Wiener, E.L. (1995b).
Cockpit. cabin communication: Recent research.
In the Proceedings of the 48th International
Air Safety Seminar, Seattle WA
- May 2004, The Association of Flight, November
7-9, 1995. Given at a Full Committee Hearing:
Aviation Security ,Tuesday, June 22 2004
- 9:30 AM - SR ? 253, Rosenberg, Alyssa Union
leaders call for airport security training,
November 02,2007 Govexec.com By Chris Strohm
May 12, 2004
- The Testimony of Ms. Patricia Friend, International
President, Association of Flight Attendants-CWA
Written by Lori J. Brown, © 2007, for Skycolors
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